Research & Design — Top-of-Block Auctions for Rollkit #94
Description
1️⃣ Goal
Determine how Rollkit-based rollups could run a top-of-block (ToB) auction that lets builders/payors bid for the first N bytes of each block, either:
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Execution-layer specific – implemented inside a given Rollkit app-chain, or
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Rollkit-framework wide – a pluggable module others can import.
The outcome should clarify feasibility, surface design options, and recommend an implementation path (or explicitly reject the idea if unsuitable).
2️⃣ Background / Why it matters
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ToB auctions monetize desirable ordering rights (MEV) while aligning incentives between block producers and users.
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Different ecosystems (e.g., Ethereum L2s, Cosmos SDK chains) are experimenting with off-chain builders, mev-boost–style relays, or in-protocol bids.
3️⃣ Scope & Key Questions
| Area | Questions to Answer |
|---|---|
| Market design | Fixed-price vs. sealed-bid? Single-slot vs. batch? Slippage & refund rules? |
| Where to run the auction? | Inside the Rollkit consensus engine? As a pre-block ABCI+ hook? Via an external relay? |
| Security & censorship | How to prevent malicious builders censoring bids or DOS-ing proposers? |
| Cross-chain interaction | How would an auction interact with DA layers (e.g., Celestia) and shared sequencers? |
| Economic impact | Revenue share model — who captures value (validators, sequencers, Rollkit dev fund)? |
| Implementation effort | Δ to Rollkit codebase, interfaces needed, backward compatibility constraints. |