From 0344887b3da1d25377702f9c5306a7b0cf947e94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TrellixVulnTeam Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2022 05:48:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Adding tarfile member sanitization to extractall() --- .../Thonny/Lib/tarfile.py" | 21 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git "a/\345\274\200\345\217\221\347\216\257\345\242\203/Thonny/Lib/tarfile.py" "b/\345\274\200\345\217\221\347\216\257\345\242\203/Thonny/Lib/tarfile.py" index 3be5188c..b1a57830 100644 --- "a/\345\274\200\345\217\221\347\216\257\345\242\203/Thonny/Lib/tarfile.py" +++ "b/\345\274\200\345\217\221\347\216\257\345\242\203/Thonny/Lib/tarfile.py" @@ -2498,7 +2498,26 @@ def main(): if is_tarfile(src): with TarFile.open(src, 'r:*') as tf: - tf.extractall(path=curdir) + def is_within_directory(directory, target): + + abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory) + abs_target = os.path.abspath(target) + + prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target]) + + return prefix == abs_directory + + def safe_extract(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False): + + for member in tar.getmembers(): + member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name) + if not is_within_directory(path, member_path): + raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File") + + tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) + + + safe_extract(tf, path=curdir) if args.verbose: if curdir == '.': msg = '{!r} file is extracted.'.format(src)